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FROM "IS" TO "OUGHT" : KOHLBERG, 
LONERGAN, AND METHOD 
IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
Cynthia S.W. CRYSDALE 
RESUME. — Cet article est un réexamen et une critique de la défense par Laurence 
Kohlberg des présupposés philosophiques et normatifs implicites en sa théorie 
psychologique du développement moral. Kohlberg prétend qu'il peut valider ses 
prétentions normatives (« ought ») en renvoyant à sa recherche empirique (« is ») 
et inversement. Après avoir réexaminé son argumentation, je soulève plusieurs 
questions : (1) Kohlberg lui-même ne semble pas voir clairement s'il défend son 
argumentation sur des bases empiriques ou philosophiques ; (2) je mets en doute 
que la moralité « à principes » de /'« étape 6» soit nécessairement une moralité de 
justice ; (3) je mets en doute son présupposé que toutes les différences morales 
soient uniquement « développementales » ; et (4) son concept des principes comme 
des abstractions de la réalité concrète ne parvient pas, à mon sens, à refléter la 
vraie nature du conflit moral. Pour finir, je présente la théorie cognitive de Bernard 
Lonergan comme un fondement plus adéquat pour traiter des importantes questions 
auxquelles Kohlberg tente de répondre. 
SUMMARY. — This article is a review and critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's defense of 
the philosophical and normative assumptions implicit in his psychological theory of 
moral development. Kohlberg claims that he can validate his normative claims 
("ought") by reference to his empirical research ("is") and visa versa. Having 
reviewed his argument, I raise several issues : (1) Kohlberg himself seems unclear 
as to whether he is defending his argument on empirical or philosophical grounds, 
(2) I question whether the "principled" morality of "Stage 6" is necessarily a 
morality of justice, (3) I question his assumption that all moral differences are 
merely developmental and, (4) his concept of principles as abstractions from 
concrete reality fails, in my estimation, to reflect the true nature of moral conflict. 
Finally, I present Bernard Lonergan's cognitional theory as a more adequate 
foundation from which to deal with the important questions that Kohlberg is 
attempting to answer. 
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LAWRENCE KOHLBERG is a Harvard psychologist who began his research on j moral development in the late 50's. In line with Piaget's cognitive-developmental 
approach to moralization, Kohlberg tested a group of boys on a number of 
hypothetical moral dilemmas.1 Based on this research, he proposed a theory of six 
stages of moral development.2 Children are said to pass through these stages in an 
invariant sequence as they increasingly differentiate and integrate their reasons for 
certain moral judgments. In very general terms, the stages involve shifts from 
considerations of physical aspects of a situation (wealth, status, punishment) to 
criteria of social approval/disapproval and, finally, to abstract moral principles in 
determining the right solution to a moral conflict. Though the implications of 
Kohlberg's theory are most salient in the psychological and educational fields, 
Kohlberg himself has tackled certain philosophical issues, most notably that of the 
relationship between determinations of what is and justification of what ought to be. 
In this article I would like to 1) make a few comments on the strengths and 
weaknesses of Kohlberg's attempt to wed empirical psychology and moral philosophy 
and 2) give an account of how Bernard Lonergan has more satisfactorily addressed 
the questions that Kohlberg raises. I have chosen these issues because they are central 
to a broad range of concerns about method in the human sciences. 
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development and the Is/Ought Dilemma 
In his article 'Trom Is to Ought : How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and 
get away with it in the Study of Moral Development," 3 Lawrence Kohlberg draws 
out the implications of his theory of moral development for philosophical ethics. His 
concern goes in two directions : first, he wants to ground his psychological studies in 
1. Kohlberg's research has taken two forms. His initial study was cross-sectional, studying age-linked 
groups of boys and postulating a developmental relationship between these groups. For an exposition 
of this initial work see Lawrence KOHLBERG, "Stage and Sequence: the Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach to Socialization," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. D.A. Goslin 
(Chicago : Rand, McNally and Co., 1969). Kohlberg then followed these boys throughout the next two 
decades in an effort to generate longitudinal evidence for his theory. This has been published as : 
A.COLBY, L. KOHLBERG, J. GIBBS, and M. LIEBFRMAN, A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983). For a shorter and more "popular" account of 
Kohlberg's theory, see L. KOHLBERG, "The Child as Moral Philosopher," in Psychology Today 7 
(1968), 25-30. For Piaget's earlier account of moral development see Jean PIAGET, The Moral 
Judgment of the Child (London : Kegan Paul, 1932). 
2. Initially, Kohlberg postulated six stages of moral development. More recently, due to both 
philosophical criticism and lack of empirical evidence for Stage 6, he has limited his theory to five 
stages. He continues to hold Stage 6 as a speculative ideal for moral development and a "yet to be 
proven" stage of moral development. See L. KOHLBERG, The Psychology of Moral Development, vol. II 
of Essays on Moral Development (San Francisco : Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 270-274. 
3. L. KOHLBERG, "From Is to Ought : How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with it in 
the Study of Moral Development," in The Philosophy of Moral Development, vol. I of Essays on Moral 
Development (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 101-189. This article was originally 
published in 1971 in Cognitive Development andEpistemology, ed, T. Mischel (New York: Academic 
Press). Since this section of my article focusses almost entirely on this Kohlberg article, future 
references to it will be by page number in the text. Any page number in the text can be assumed to 
refer to the 1981 publication unless otherwise indicated. 
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a philosophical and an epistemological theory, and second, he states what he thinks 
his psychological theory can contribute to philosophical moral questions. Although 
he rejects a simplistic use of the "naturalistic fallacy", he does believe that there is a 
relationship between "is" ("the development of knowledge and morality") and 
"ought" ("epistemological and moral norms and criteria") (p. 105).4 He denies that 
ought statements can be derived from is statements but does presuppose the "fallacy" 
that "the ought statements of philosophers of knowledge and morality, and the is 
statements of psychologists of knowledge and morality, should be based on mutual 
awareness" (p. 105). 
Kohlberg begins his article with a rejection of behaviorists who consider learning 
to be simply a stimulus-response association. Just as Piaget could only study 
cognitive development by having a concept of knowledge in relation to which 
children's thinking was observed, so Kohlberg defends his philosophical concept of 
morality and admits that he began his research with certain assumptions about 
human development : 
... I started my studies of moral development fifteen years ago with the notion 
(l)that there were universal ontogenetic trends toward the development of 
morality as it has been conceived for Western moral philosophers, and (2) that 
the development of such "rational" or "nature morality" is a process different 
from the learning of various "irrational" or "arbitrary" cultural rules and values 
(p. 105). 
Kohlberg thus rejects "the common assumptions of the cultural relativity of ethics, 
on which almost all contemporary social scientific theorizing about morality is 
based" (p. 105) as well as the corresponding view that moral and social development 
do not involve increments of knowledge but are simply the internalization of the 
norms of a given culture. Kohlberg advocates the universally normative character of 
moral development but sees these norms as the goal towards which development is 
headed, rather than as culturally defined and inculcated values. He is concerned to 
demonstrate the evidence for a "nonrelativist 'cognitive-developmental' theory of the 
developmental process" (p. 106). He says, 
My account is based on a rejection of the relativity assumption and an 
acceptance of the contrasting view that "ethical principles" are the end product 
of sequential "natural" development in social functioning and thinking ; corres-
pondingly, the stimulation of their development is a different matter from the 
inculcation of arbitrary cultural beliefs (p. 106). 
Kohlberg goes on to tackle the assumptions of many social scientists regarding 
ethical relativity. He claims that many of them fail to distinguish cultural relativity 
(the fact of value diversity among many cultures) from ethical relativity (the 
assumption that there are no principles or methods which could resolve such 
4. The term "naturalistic fallacy" was coined by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 1913). It generally refers to an assumption that knowing values is not distinct from 
knowing facts, and that the facts of a situation automatically determine what ought to be done. It is 
this conflation of facts and values that Moore termed a "fallacy" and that Kohlberg wants to maintain 
in a qualified sense. 
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diversity).5 He accuses them of committing the naturalistic fallacy by assuming that 
the fact that "everyone has their own values" necessarily means "everyone ought to 
have their own values" (p. 107).6 He criticizes those who confuse ethical relativity 
with ethical tolerance, who assume that in order to be tolerant of those with different 
values one must also assume that there are no universal prescriptions. He points out 
the inconsistency of the American Anthropological Association when it pleaded for 
"tolerance for diversity of beliefs and values" on the grounds that no principles are 
universalizable. The inconsistency lay in the failure of the Association to realize that 
its plea for tolerance appealed to tolerance as a universal principle (p. 110). Finally, 
he criticizes those who assume that by adopting ethical relativism they are being 
scientifically neutral. To the contrary, he claims, ethical relativism itself implies a 
normative ethical and social science theory.7 
Thus, Kohlberg rejects any approach which assumes that the facts dictate what 
ought to be or that dispensing with norms, values, or principles is a way of being 
either tolerant or scientifically neutral. He admits that one's philosophical starting 
point affects one's research and then defends his own assumption that certain 
universal principles (such as justice) can be used to arbitrate between or evaluate 
varying cultural norms. Having rejected ethical relativism Kohlberg is seeking to 
define morality as a universal phenomenon with universal substantive principles 
which can be used as criteria for judging the relative adequacy of various types of 
moral reasoning. "A morality on which universal agreement could be based would 
require... that moral obligation be directly derived from a substantive moral principle 
that can define the choices of any person without conflict or inconsistency" (pp. 161-
162). He claims that a truly moral judgment will have formal characteristics such as 
impersonality, ideality, and universalizability (p. 170). He further claims that these 
formal criteria increase as one develops towards moral maturity. 
This recognition shows (1) that there are formal criteria that make judgments 
moral, and (2) that these are only fully met by the most mature stage of moral 
judgment, so that (3) our mature stages of judgment are more moral (in the 
formalist sense, more morally adequate) than less mature stages (p. 170). 
Thus, a truly consistent and universalizable morality is only achieved when one 
learns to use principles for moral reasoning. Stage 6 "principled" morality is the goal 
of development and, in fact, defines what it means to be moral. 
5. Although Kohlberg does not do this, let me further point out a distinction among ethical relativists 
between those who believe that ethical criteria perhaps exist but cannot be known with any certainty 
(ethical agnostics) and those who believe that there are no ethical criteria at all (absolute ethical 
relativists). These latter are often emotivists who claim that ethical standards are mere expressions of 
emotion with no cognitive criteria of judgment. 
6. Cf. KOHLBERG, "From IS to OUGHT," pp. 107-108 where Kohlberg criticizes L.S. F I U I R . 
Psychoanalysis and Ethics (Springfield, 111. : Thomas, 1955) for rejecting any meaning to words like 
good and bad at the same time that he continues to make value judgments. 
7. Cf. KOHLBERG, "From IS to OUGHT," pp. 112-114 where Kohlberg criticizes Berkowitz, Durkheim, 
and Weber along these same lines. 
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A formalistic normative theory says, "Stage 6 is what it means to judge morally. 
If you want to play the moral game, if you want to make decisions which anyone 
could agree upon in resolving social conflicts, Stage 6 is it" (p. 172).8 
Kohlberg further asserts that, if mature morality has the formal characteristics 
described, the principle of justice will be central to any truly moral judgment. 
If my formal characterization of the functioning of mature principles is correct, 
it is clear that only principles of justice have an ultimate claim to being adequate 
universal prescriptive principles. By definition, principles of justice are principles 
for deciding between competing claims of individuals, for "giving each person 
his due." When principles, including considerations of human welfare, are 
reduced to guides for considering such claims, they become expressions of the 
single principle of justice (p. 175). 
The core of principled morality (Stage 6) is justice. Principles of justice are 
therefore the most adequate criteria for moral judgment and the principles towards 
which moral development is oriented. Kohlberg thus traces the development of 
justice as it and its inherent criteria of reversibility and universalizability operate 
throughout the stages (pp. 147-168). There is a "justice structure" to each stage 
which becomes ever more differentiated and complex as persons develop. The final 
goal of this development is reached when justice concerns go beyond concrete 
cultural rules (Stages 3 and 4) or mere procedural solutions (Stage 5) to a truly 
universalizable decision, a decision "acceptable to any person involved in the 
situation who must play one of the roles affected by the decision, but does not know 
which role he or she will play" (p. 168). The formal psychological criteria for 
development are increased differentiation and integration ; these find moral parallels 
in the increased prescriptivity (differentiation between facts and values) and univer-
salizability (consistency) of later stages. 
A Critique of Kohlberg's Argument 
Although I agree with the most general thrust of Kohlberg's approach, i.e. the 
assumption that there are norms operative in human development which are the 
objects of one's ongoing attempt to resolve moral questions, I question the adequacy 
of his argument for principles of justice on several grounds. Before elucidating these 
specifically, let me note that his argument is made obscure by his continuing 
confusion as to whether he is proving his argument "objectively" and "empirically" 
or defending an a priori, sui generis choice for justice and deontological morality. 
Thus, in tackling "moderate sociological relativism" which holds that morality is 
formally but not substantively cross-cultural, he defends a mild doctrine of social 
evolutionism, claiming that one culture can be judged more moral or better than 
another since he and others have discovered "objective" moral criteria. 
8. As stated above, the empirical status of Stage 6 remains questionable. Although Kohlberg has 
admitted this empirical uncertainty, the outline he gives here of Stage 6 continues to be the norm or 
"moral ideal" upon which his theory is based. In addition, much of what he says here would now be 
applied to Stage 5. Cf. KOHLBERG, Psychology, Chap. 3. 
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Although Westernmarck assumed that one cannot define the more advanced 
without an arbitrary value standard, Hobhouse and our own group define a 
"developed consciousness" by objective measures of ontogenetic or historical 
sequence, measures quite independent of "agreement with the speaker's 
conviction" (p. 129). 
That Kohlberg himself is not entirely satisfied with his "objective" argument for 
justice is made clear towards the end of the article when he resorts to defending 
justice simply on the grounds that no better alternative has been proposed : 
The fact that psychological study shows that no one does use unjust "principles" 
in a formally principled way, is no proof that they cannot. However, it is of more 
moment that no philosopher ever has seriously attempted to demonstrate that 
an alternative substantive principle to justice could function in a universal 
fashion in a satisfactory way. ... In summary, if a formalistic definition of moral 
principle is unjustified, no one has proposed a better definition. And if an 
equation of moral principle with justice is injustified, no one has proposed a 
satisfactory alternative (p. 177). 
In resorting to this negative defense of justice, Kohlberg not only dismisses and 
ignores whole sections of philosophy within Western history (for example, Christian 
moral philosophy which takes love as its focus) but misses the entire point — that 
values and their corresponding models of morality are proven neither by empirical 
research nor by a "consensus" argument. His entire argument reduces, at some point, 
to a justification of deontological morality and justice over against other theories and 
values, an a priori assumption rather than an a posteriori fact.9 
Nevertheless, given Kohlberg's confusion on his philosophical methodology, we 
can still examine his model of morality to see if it is an accurate and helpful model for 
explaining the normative aspect of human development. Here I would like to raise 
several interrelated issues regarding "principles" and "justice." First, I question his 
equation of Stage 6 principled morality with justice. This is connected to his (false) 
assumption that all moral differences are simply developmental. Further, I question 
whether his concept of principles as abstractions from culture and concrete reality 
adequately reflects the true nature of moral conflict. Finally, Kohlberg's inconsistency 
on whether the universal core of morality is formal or substantive only obscures the 
other issues. 
To raise the first issue, Kohlberg seems to make two points about Stage 6 
morality: first, that it is formal principles (e.g., treat each person as an end, not a 
means) that "tell us how to resolve claims that compete in a situation" and, second, 
that only principles of justice are "adequate, universal, prescriptive principles" 
9. In more recent works Kohlberg has shown greater sensitivity to the difference between philosophical 
argumentation and empirical verification (Cf. KOHLBERG, Psychology, Chap. 3, esp. pp. 222-224). He 
now acknowledges the need to defend his philosophical claims on philosophical grounds. He now 
maintains that empirical evidence cannot prove philosophical claims but should be complementary to 
them. In spite of Kohlberg's greater clarity on this issue, I believe that there are still significant 
confusions about what constitutes objectivity and the manner in which a priori claims are verified. On 
the objectivity issue, see E. MORELLI, "The Sixth Stage of Moral Development," Journal of Moral 
Development 7 (1978), 97-108. 
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(p. 175). He thus assumes that one cannot reach Stage 6 "principled" morality 
without also using principles of justice in one's moral reasoning. Prescinding, for the 
moment, from the question of whether such abstracted morality is even possible, I 
question whether a "principled" conscience is necessarily a just one. As Alston puts 
it: 
What Kohlberg really wants most to recommend to our acceptance is the 
principle of justice (in his interpretation) as a supreme moral principle. But 
stages of prescriptivity will not advance that cause. A judgment based on a 
principle of racial destiny or on no principle at all, can be just as prescriptive as a 
judgment based on an application of Kohlberg's principle of justice.10 
What Alston is referring to here is Kohlberg's claim that prescriptivity and 
universality (as the formal characteristics of a moral judgment) increase through the 
stages so that Stage 6 justice is the most prescriptive and most universal. What 
Kohlberg misses is the point that it is only from his "mature" perspective that he 
considers Stage 4 morality (or any other stage) to lack prescriptivity and universality. 
A moral judgment seen from within the stage itself is completely prescriptive (a 
statement about what ought to be done) and applies to everyone within the social 
world of that particular stage. Judgments are equally moral (in the formal sense) at 
every stage. If universality and prescriptivity increase, it is only in the sense that the 
"all" to which prescriptive judgments apply gets ever larger and more differentiated 
as one's social world expands and that part of this differentiation is the differentiation 
of the given (external authority) from the self, i.e., an increasing internal locus for the 
"ought". The social world expands to incorporate an ever-larger "all" as one's self-
concept differentiates towards increasing autonomy. Thus, as Alston points out, 
Kohlberg's claim that justice is the only possible universal prescriptive principle is, 
again, only Kohlberg's predilection that it ought to be the one central virtue. 
In responding to Alston, Kohlberg retreats to a "consensus" argument once 
again : 
For most of us, it is counterintuitive to believe that racial destiny could be held 
as a universal, prescriptive principle. This is because no human being held it or 
similar beliefs as such a principle, at least none in research studies done by my 
colleagues and myself. Hitler himself explicitly said, "Might makes right" —that 
is, his judgments were nonprescriptive. And he explicitly held that Nazi morality 
was nonuniversal — that is, it was not designed to govern the decisions of Jews 
and others (p. 177). 
Kohlberg here falsely assumes that because he himself does not believe in Aryan 
supremacy, it is "counterintuitive," "nonprescriptive," and "nonuniversal." But 
these are simply his own judgments of others' "principles." In fact, the principle of 
racial destiny was prescriptively advocated (non-Jews ought to have certain privileges 
over Jews) in a universal manner (this prescription applies to all Jews in relation to 
all non-Jews), not only by Hitler but with the support of an entire nation. Justice is 
not the only principle which can claim prescriptivity and universality. 
10. W.P. ALSTON, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From IS to OUGHT"' in Cognitive Development and 
Epistemology, ed. T. Mischel (New York : Academic Press, 1971). 
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This touches on another assumption that Kohlberg makes ; he seems to deny 
that there are genuine value conflicts among persons or cultures. In his effort to avoid 
ethical relativism, he claims that there are universal ethical principles on which "all 
rational men" could agree. Thus, any differences between persons or cultures are 
either complementary or, as he emphasizes, simply developmental : 
There are marked individual and cultural differences in the definition, use, and 
hierarchical ordering of these universal value concepts, but the major source of 
this variation, both within and between cultures, is developmental (p. 126). 
This further means that one can rank these differences along a continuum on which 
some types of moral reasoning are better than others. Although the differences can be 
ranked, at bottom there is no genuine conflict since aids to development could 
remedy the conflict : 
In sum, my evidence supports the following conclusions : there is a universal set 
of moral principles held by people in various cultures, Stage 6. (These principles, 
I argue, could logically and consistently be held by all people in all societies ; 
they would in fact be universal to all humankind if the conditions for sociomoral 
development were optimal for all individuals in all cultures) (pp. 127-128).n 
It seems to me that by reducing all individual and cultural differences to 
developmental differences, Kohlberg misconceives the nature of moral conflict itself. 
A moral conflict arises precisely because there are dialectical differences which 
cannot be resolved by further development. If it were merely a case of "educating" 
the druggist to see the value of another's life, the Heinz dilemma would not exist.12 
Moral dilemmas arise precisely when further education or negotiation does not 
resolve the conflict, when the persons involved hold diametrically opposed positions. 
Although some differences are, at bottom, complementary (there is no real conflict), 
and others are developmental (the difference between an adult and a child), there are 
dialectical differences in which persons hold radically opposed positions.13 These 
conflicts are resolved only if one person is "converted" to the other's position. 
Beyond this, persons must agree to disagree or, when action is demanded, act on 
one's conviction and accept the consequences. 
11. The assumption that all differences are simply developmental has a tendency to become cultural 
arrogance. Anyone who does not fit the chosen norm is considered "less developed" or "culturally 
deprived1'. Kohlberg is guilty of this in reference to the data on Atayal children which he explains as 
regression due to "contamination" by cultural factors. The "slower rate" of development among 
Atayal children results from their "somewhat cognitively impoverished culture" just as the same 
slower rate among American slum Negro children arises from cultural deprivation. Cf. "Stage and 
Sequence," pp. 358-359. The possibility that these other cultures have criteria for reality or right and 
wrong which are dialectically different from (and deserving the attention of) Kohlberg does not seem 
to occur to him. 
12. The Heinz dilemma is the most famous of the moral conflicts presented to subjects in Kohlberg's 
studies. It involves a man, Heinz, whose wife is dying of cancer. The one drug which might save her 
life is available only from a druggist who is charging an exorbitant price. Subjects must decide whether 
Heinz, who cannot afford the drug, should break the law and steal it or obey the law and allow his 
wife to die. It is the reasons given for a particular answer rather than the specific choice itself, which 
determine the moral stage of the subject. 
13. These categories of differences come from Bernard Lonergan's discussion of horizon in Method in 
Theology (New York : Seabury Press, 1972) p. 236. 
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This failure to recognize truly dialectical conflicts is not unrelated to Kohlberg's 
notion that Stage 6 is better because it relies on principles which are free of cultural 
content. Whereas the earlier stages are categories of morality which are culturally 
defined, Stage 6 principles are more universal because they abstract from the concrete 
context. 
At lower levels than Stage 5 or 6, morality is not held in a fully principled form. 
Accordingly, it is more subject to specific content influence by group definition 
of the situation than is principled morality. ... Even Stage 6 principles are 
somewhat accommodate to cultural content, for example, Lincoln and Jefferson 
were able to partially accommodate their principles to slavery in response to 
social pressure (p. 128). 
The impression given here is that the ideal type of moral functioning is culture-
free and would entail holding certain principles in spite of or abstracted from the 
concrete cultural context. To allow concrete considerations or cultural values into 
one's decision-making is a regrettable "accommodation." Nevertheless, Kohlberg 
does claim that these abstract, formal principles can be used in concrete situations of 
conflict by using "universalizability" and "reversibility" to arrive at equilibrated role 
taking. By recognizing the claims of every other party and by taking each role in turn, 
one can resolve the moral conflict : 
In the sense just outlined, a universalizable decision is a decision acceptable to 
any person involved in the situation who must play one of the roles affected by 
the decision, but does not know which role he or she will play. This perspective is 
not that of the greatest good, nor is it that of an ideal spectator. Rather, it is a 
perspective sharable by all people, each of whom is concerned about the 
consequences to him or her under conditions of justice (p. 168). 
Again, Kohlberg appears to labor under the illusion of the abstract nature of 
moral judgment.14 I am not saying that there are no general moral principles by 
which one seeks to live, nor that persons make moral judgments without some 
criteria. The point is that discerning the principle (treat each person as an end, not a 
means) is only the first step, which does not resolve the concrete conflict. Rather, the 
conflict arises precisely because the principles cannot be clearly applied — one finds 
oneself in a situation in which someone must by treated as a means to an end and the 
dilemma is to decide whom it will be. Philosopher 3 and Kohlberg, in their 
assumption that Heinz's wife's life is more valuable than the druggist's property, fail 
to see that by stealing the drug, Heinz uses the druggist as a means to an end 
14. This is another area in which Kohlberg has taken seriously the objections of his critics. He has 
clarified his notion of principles (Cf. KOHLBERG, Psychology, pp. 296-300). His current position is that 
principles are not something "outside" the particular situation but "filters" through which one 
interprets the situation. I believe that this nuance is helpful but does not fully recognize that the good 
is always known concretely and that common sense (which is what, in fact, he is studying) aims, "not 
at establishing general truths, but at building up a core of habitual understanding that is to be adjusted 
by further learning in each new situation that arises" [Cf. B. LONERGAN, Insight : A Study of Human 
Understanding (San Francisco : Harper and Row, 1957), p. 297]. I believe that, in his best moments, 
this "habitual understanding" is what Kohlberg means by "principles." Still, his conception of 
principles retains elements of the "already-out-there-now-real." 
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(pp. 162-168). The judgment that Heinz should steal the drug is simply a decision 
that it is better for Heinz to use the druggist as a means (to save his wife) than it is for 
the druggist to use Heinz as a means (for profit). Likewise, all the rhetoric about 
"universalizability" fails to see that moral conflicts often arise precisely because each 
cannot be given his or her due, and a choice must be made as to whom will be treated 
unfairly. Kohlberg himself alludes to conflicts between distributive and commutative 
justice, (p. 144) yet glosses over these differences (and centuries of discussion in 
philosophy, political science, and ethics) as if justice were a singular, clear-cut 
principle. Further, the notion that one ought to be willing to take the role of any 
other party in the conflict fails to give credit to the subjectivity of conflict. In 
hypothetical or ideal cases, ceasing to be a self-interested subject and taking on the 
role of others might work, but in concrete situations one makes one's judgments as a 
subject whose claims are part of the conflict. If each party were willing to take the role 
of any other, the conflict would not have arisen in the first place ! 
There is one final confusion in Kohlberg which I would like to point out. Much 
of his argument rests on his claim that there are universal ethical principles which 
function in all cultures. He does not make it clear, however, whether this universal 
core of morality is formal or substantive, whether he is discussing the structure of 
moral judgment or its content. On the one hand, his theory of stages depends on 
structural, ontogenetic development; he studies the way persons reason morally 
rather than the particular choices they make. 
It is this emphasis on the distinctive form (as opposed to the content) of the 
child's moral thought that allows us to call moral development universal (p. 116). 
So also, in his philosophical discussions, he uses a formal definition of morality. 
I am arguing that a criterion of adequacy must take account of the fact that 
morality is a unique, sui generis realm. If it is unique, its uniqueness must be 
defined by general formal criteria, so my metaethical conception is formalistic. 
Like most deontological moral philosophers since Kant, 1 define morality in 
terms of the formal character of a moral judgment, method, or point of view, 
rather than in terms of its content (p. 170). 
In this same vein, Kohlberg often uses the word "principles" in a very general, formal 
way, meaning the criteria of moral judgment. "In our empirical work, I and my 
colleagues considered the term principles to refer to considerations in moral choice, 
or to reasons justifying moral action" (p. 174). 
In spite of this emphasis on the formal criteria of moral judgment, Kohlberg at 
other times claims that the core of morality must be "substantively universal" (p. 166). 
He rejects the "moderate sociological relativists" who believe morality is formally 
universal even though cultural content varies. He insists that there is more to 
universal morality than simply form : 
I am arguing, then, that even moderate or sociological relativism is misleading in 
its interpretation of the facts : not only is there a universal moral form, but the 
basic content principles of morality are also universal (p. 126). 
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Later, in analyzing Philosopher 3's discussion of the Heinz dilemma, he says, 
I (and Philosopher 3) claim that full universalization of moral judgment requires 
more than a formalistic claim — it requires substantive moral principles. These 
principles are themselves limited to those which are fully universalizable. ... The 
substantive principles meeting this claim are "justice" and "respect for 
personality" (p. 126). 
In these passages "principles" are not simply formal — they have content. By 
speaking of Stage 6 as "principled" morality he clearly means something other than a 
morality which uses criteria for judgment, since each stage has its own criteria or 
"principles." Somehow, at Stage 6, "principles" takes on substantive justice. 
"Formalists who disagree with the primacy of justice usually do so because they wish 
to keep morality completely content-free" (p. 176). Kohlberg claims that he can 
bridge this gap between form and content because justice is the only substantive 
"principle" which meets the formal criteria of prescriptivity, universalizability and 
reversibility. But, as I have already pointed out, many principles claim prescriptivity 
and universalizability, and since we live in an imperfect world, moral conflicts often 
demand that we restrict the "universal" and decide with whom we will reverse roles, 
given that we can't take everyone's part. 
In conclusion, Kohlberg makes an innovative and bold attempt to define the 
relationship between empirical psychological research and philosophical moral 
issues. Unsatisfied with the ethical relativism of much social scientific theory, he tries 
to ground his own research in an unrevisable and universal moral value : justice. 
Although I sympathize with the issue that he is trying to address, I believe that his 
solution is less than adequate. With regard to his deontological morality, I question 
whether principled morality is necessarily a morality of justice and whether one can 
jump so easily from a study of the formal aspects of moral reasoning to a claim that 
only one substantive principle, justice, is an adequate criterion for moral judgment. 
Further, I question whether Kohlberg's assumption that all value differences are 
developmental and his notion of Stage 6 morality as abstracted from cultural content 
deals adequately with the nature of moral conflict. When persons hold diametrically 
opposed positions or have mutually exclusive claims, principles of universalizability 
and reversibility simply beg the question. In short, I do not think Kohlberg has 
adequately grounded his formal notion of morality in the actual operations of the 
human subject. In appealing to justice to do this job, he is simply taking one 
substantive and abstract value and tracing its development through the stages. 
Contrary to his intentions, this neither refutes ethical relativism, nor "proves" that a 
higher stage is a better one. 
Lonergan's Philosophy and the Is/Ought Dilemma 
As an alternative approach to the issues Kohlberg deals with, I would like to 
present Bernard Lonergan's analysis of human consciousness. Lonergan grounds his 
analysis on operations of human knowing which are both concrete and universal ; an 
unrevisable and dynamic set of operations which cannot be denied without self-
contradiction. He uses this analysis of human knowing as the basis of a method in 
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Theology. I believe his distinctions could also serve as a valuable ground for method 
in any human science and could go a long way toward answering the kind of issues 
that Kohlberg raises. Let me briefly outline Lonergan's basic approach and then 
draw some implications useful for further discussion. 
In the first chapter of Method in Theology 15 Lonergan outlines a basic pattern of 
operations which recurs in all human knowing and doing. In operations such as 
seing, hearing, inquiring, conceiving, formulating, marshalling and weighing evidence, 
judging, deciding, speaking, writing there is an invariant pattern. Lonergan discusses 
this pattern as four levels of consciousness.16 On the empirical level, the data of the 
world around us and of our own consciousness impinges upon us. At this level we 
simply experience the data of sense and the images, memories or feelings arising 
spontaneously within us. Yet as humans we not only perceive a multitude of 
unconnected data, we naturally seek the intelligibility of this data. Thus, on the 
second, the intellectual level of consciousness, understanding is the prime operation. 
We inquire and question, What? How? and Why? We develop concepts and 
hypotheses to explain the phenomena ; we seek insight into the given perceptions. Yet 
knowing is never complete at this level. For though knowledge is hard won, insights 
and theories are a dime a dozen, and beyond understanding and conceiving, human 
intelligence moves on to ask, is it so? Thus, at the rational level, hypotheses and 
conceptions give way to critical reflection. The questions now regard, not Why? 
How? or What? but Whether? and the answer is either Yes or No. Human persons 
are not content to live with possibilities ; we insist on knowing the true, the real, and 
the "pure desire to know" pushes us ever forward toward a more complete grasp of 
truth. 
Whereas knowing is the compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging, 
human persons not only know, we also act. So beyond the questions for intelligence 
(What ? Why ? How ?) and the questions for critical reflection (Whether ? Is it so ?) we 
also ponder courses of action — Is it worthwhile ? What ought I to do ? So the fourth 
level on which the conscious subject operates is the responsible level of deciding. 
Here we deliberate, evaluate, consider goals and possible courses of action. It is this 
level which regards value. 
Having outlined this basic pattern of operations, several observations must be 
made. First, though articulated as a sequence, these operations do not necessarily 
occur one at a time. Rather, the elementary operations of the four levels combine to 
form a unity : 
But as the many elementary objects are constructed into larger wholes, as the 
many operations are conjoined in a single compound knowing, so too the many 
levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single 
thrust, the eros of the human spirit. To know the good it must know the real ; to 
15. Bernard LONERGAN, Method in Theology (New York : Seabury Press, 1972). Future references to this 
work will appear in the text as : Lonergan, MIT. 
16. "Consciousness" for Lonergan is not "awareness" in the sense of self-consciousness or introspection. 
Rather, one is conscious in that one is neither in a dreamless sleep nor in a coma but is awake, 
attending, questioning, judging, deciding and acting. See LONERGAN, MIT, pp. 6-13. 
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know the real, it must know the true ; to know the true it must know the 
intelligible; to know the intelligible it must attend to the data (Lonergan, MIT, 
p. 13). 
Occasionally, in particular endeavors, we carefully prescind from one operation in 
order to pursue another ; thus, scientific method can use observation, can hypothesize, 
and can test theories by pursuing sufficient evidence.17 But in daily living the four 
levels of operations go forward spontaneously, dynamically and in a compound 
unity. It is only by stopping and "objectifying" what we are doing that we notice and 
name the processes. 
Secondly, though the "objectification" — the articulation of the pattern — can 
be revised or reworded, the pattern which forms the dynamic structure of human 
consciousness is itself unrevisable (Lonergan, MIT, pp. 16-19). The question is 
whether, in fact, human knowing involves distinct operations of experiencing, 
understanding, and judging. But this question itself betrays the orientation to truth, 
the critical reflection which seeks knowledge of what is so. And any attempt to 
oppose the fact of these operations and propose another theory of knowledge will 
seek an intelligible theory, a pattern, a coherence in our cognitional processes and 
will, thus, betray the fact that human intelligence involves understanding. Certainly 
any argument against the pattern will appeal to the data and, unless one is asleep or 
in a coma, one operates on the level of experience. Finally, the very effort to "get 
things straight" presupposes the value judgment that getting things straight is 
worthwhile. Thus, while perhaps the formulation of this pattern of operations 
warrants expansion or revision, one cannot deny the fact of experiencing, under-
standing, judging and deciding without engaging in self-contradiction : "In brief, 
conscious and intentional operations exist and anyone that cares to deny their 
existence is merely disqualifying himself as a non-responsible, non-reasonable, 
nonintelligent somnambulist" (Lonergan, MIT, p. 17). 
Thirdly, while the operations on these four levels are conscious, they are also 
intentional. This refers, not to the answers to questions but to the nature of the 
questions themselves. Before answers are known, the questions intend what would be 
known if it were known. Here Lonergan introduces the distinction between categories 
and transcendentals. Whereas categories are determinations with a limited denotation, 
which vary from culture to culture, "the transcendentals are comprehensive in 
connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant over cultural change. While 
categories are needed to put determinate questions and give determinate answers, the 
transcendentals are contained in questions prior to the answers. They are the radical 
intending that moves us from ignorance to knowledge" (Lonergan, MIT, p. 11). The 
operations are intentional in that they move us beyond what we know to what we do 
not know yet. But this intentionality is not random ; it pursues a goal and the content 
of what is intended can be objectified to yield transcendental concepts : 
17. Kohlberg himself isolates and uses distinct aspects of scientific method. He recognizes the need to 
verify hypotheses with sufficient evidence. His problem lies in his tendency to not distinguish the 
"factual" aspects of his hypotheses from the evaluative assumptions in them. He is quick to point out 
these different dimensions in others hypotheses but slow to recognize them in his own. For example, 
see his discussion of middle-class and ghetto values in "IS to OUGHT", p. 111. 
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So if we objectify the content of intelligent intending, we form the transcendental 
concept of the intelligible. If we objectify the content of reasonable intending we 
form the transcendental concepts of the true and the real. If we objectify the 
content of responsible intending, we get the transcendental concept of value, of 
the truly good (Lonergan, MIT, pp. 11-12). 
Lonergan goes on to distinguish transcendental concepts from transcendental 
notions. The objectified contents of what is intended by questions for intelligence, for 
judgment and for decision are the concepts just named. But prior to these concepts 
and prior to the answers to questions, there are the notions of the intelligible, the true 
or real, and value and the good. These transcendental notions are a priori notions 
which, 
constitute the very dynamism of our conscious intending, promoting us from 
mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere understanding towards 
truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action. That dynamism, 
so far from being a product of cultural advance, is the condition of its 
possibility ; and any ignorance or error, any negligence or malice that mis-
represents or blocks that dynamism is obscurantism in its most radical form 
(Lonergan, MIT, p. 12). 
Lonergan grounds his method in the unrevisability of the operations of human 
consciousness. These operations cannot be denied without actual self-contradiction. 
The process of objectifying these operations can be a long one of self-appropriation 
(Cf. Lonergan, MIT, pp. 14-15) yet this objectification reveals the given dynamism of 
human consciousness, the thrust of the pure desire to know and the a priori 
transcendental notions of the intelligible, the true, and the good. 
Lonergan goes one step further in his discussion of transcendental notions : 
Not only do the transcendental notions promote the subject to full consciousness 
and direct him to his goals. They also provide the criteria that reveal whether the 
goals are being reached. The drive to understand is satisfied when understanding 
is reached but it is dissatisfied with every incomplete attainment and so it is the 
source of ever further questions. The drive to truth compels rationality to assent 
when evidence is sufficient but refuses assent and demands doubt whenever 
evidence is insufficient. The drive to value rewards success in self-transcendence 
with a happy conscience and saddens failures with an unhappy conscience 
(Lonergan, MIT, p. 35). 
Thus, the unrevisability of human experience, intelligence, critical reflection and 
reasonable decision yields the fact that humans function, in every question for 
knowledge or decision, with implicit notions of the intelligible, the true and the real, 
and value or the good. Let me repeat that these notions also serve as the criteria for 
arrival at knowledge of what is or what is good, and while intending is very different 
from knowing, still a person knows when he or she knows and when further questions 
must be raised. 
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The Implications of Lonergan's Approach 
Unfortunately, this review of Lonergan is brief and sketchy ; nevertheless, let me 
use it to develop several implications which could correct some of Kohlberg's false 
assumptions. Kohlberg is attempting to refute ethical relativism by claiming that one 
principle, justice, is universal. Lonergan grounds his method, not on a particular 
value but on a series of operations which occur everytime anyone seeks to 
understand, to know what is, or what ought to be. He bases his method on claims of 
universality, yet that which he claims to be universal is neither abstract nor 
determined a posteriori. What is universal are the transcendental notions intended m 
questions for understanding, judgment and decision. These notions are intended 
prior to any conceptualization or formulation of them, and serve as the criteria which 
reveal whether the goals intended by questions have been reached. Though the a 
posteriori conceptualizations may vary from culture to culture, the questions and the 
notions intended in them are universal. 
Not only are these intentional norms a priori as opposed to a posteriori in their 
universal ground, they are concrete as opposed to abstract. Whereas Kohlberg's 
model of mature or ideal morality rests on principles of justice abstracted from any 
context, Lonergan claims that the good is always concrete. We only know "the good" 
through instances of discerning it and bringing it about in specific circumstances. 
This is not to say that principles or rules of conduct cannot be extrapolated or 
defined in an abstract way or that in seeking what we ought to do in a particular 
circumstance we don't appeal to general moral codes. It simply means that "the 
good" or "what ought to be" does not reside in some abstracted, conceptual "moral 
order" with its own existence "out there" but occurs in specific instances in which 
persons discover what is right to do and then do it. 
Thus, Lonergan, like Kohlberg, appeals to universality in human functioning yet 
bases his claims on operations which are undeniable without self-contradiction, 
which intend norms rather than define them, and which occur concretely everytime 
anyone questions what is or what ought to be. At first reading, it would appear that 
Lonergan claims only formal universality and would thus be subject to Kohlberg's 
rejection as an ethical relativist. But the fact that Lonergan does not discard norms 
altogether but claims that norms are inherent a priori in human questioning, reveals 
him to be neither a relativist nor a deontologist, but a critical realist.18 He thus 
succeeds where Kohlberg is inadequate ; he grounds his notion of morality on human 
operations which are formally universal yet inherently normative as well. 
Further, Lonergan's delineation of the distinct levels of questioning helps to 
clarify the IS/OUGHT problem. Knowledge of what is, is a compound of attending, 
understanding and judging and is only complete when one makes di judgment that a 
conditional truth has its conditions fulfilled.19 Knowledge of what ought to be is 
18. For a discussion of Lonergan's distinction between the naive realist, the empiricist, the idealist and the 
critical realist see LONERGAN, MIT, pp. 238-239. 
19. For a discussion of judgment as a "virtually unconditioned" see LONERGAN, Insight, Chapters Nine 
and Ten. See especially, pp. 280ff. 
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distinct from this and involves its own distinct questions. Thus, in human living, 
questions and knowledge of what is are distinct from knowledge of what ought to be ; 
the two are not synonymous. At the same time the two are not unrelated ; getting our 
facts straight is an important factor in deciding what we ought to do. An incorrect lab 
test or diagnosis can have disastrous effects on decisions about treatment of disease. 
Conversely, the values one chooses will affect the aspects oï things to which one 
attends, the hypotheses one puts forward and the evidence one considers sufficient to 
determine the facts. An anti-semitic prejudice will severely effect the "facts" one 
discovers about Jews. 
Both the distinction and the relation between knowledge of what is and 
knowledge of what ought to be are important recognitions for method in the human 
sciences. On the one hand, the failure to recognize the interrelation of the two can 
lead to an extreme emotivism or voluntarism in ethics. On the other hand, a simple 
equation of IS and OUGHT can hide a multitude of sins : one's value-laden starting 
point is overlooked and the "facts" are declared to be self-evident. In psychology, the 
behaviorist approach with its rejection of interpretive value issues as part of its 
method, is most obviously prone to this error. Yet even Lawrence Kohlberg, who 
expressly rejects behaviorism, and even explicitly negates the naturalistic fallacy, 
assumes his own North American middle-class male model of morality as cross-
culturally normative and often resorts to an "objective" appeal to the "facts" to 
prove the validity of his model. Carol Gilligan's recent criticism of Kohlberg for 
basing his entire theory on an exclusively male sample betrays the conflation of IS 
and OUGHT and the discipline-wide assumption of male normativity.20 
Theology and philosophical ethics is no less subject to this conflation of IS and 
OUGHT. Efforts to avoid ethical relativism often lead to reaffirmations of deonto-
logical ethics which appeal to a "moral order" as given in creation. Although the 
attempt to ground ethics in more than just fluctuating predilections is noble, so called 
"natural" law is often based on a culturally and sexually biased definition of 
"nature".21 Both the distinction and the relation between our facts and our values 
must be recognized if we are to avoid cultural or sexual chauvinism. Yet if one rejects 
the "principle of the empty head", i.e., the possibility of beginning research with no 
preconceived value assumptions, an honest theological or psychological approach 
must develop a dialectical method to deal with value conflicts and their consequent 
differences regarding the "facts".22 This would involve, preliminarily, a distinction 
between purely complementary or developmental differences and those points of 
view which are diametrically opposed. Once dialectical differences are recognized, 
one must "encounter" those with whom one differs in order to determine the sound 
20. See Carol GILLIGAN, In a Different Voice : Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, 
Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1982). 
21. See Christine PIERCE, "Natural Law Language and Women," in Sex Equality, ed. Jane English 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1977). 
22. Lonergan considers "Dialectic" to be a distinct task (or "functional specialty") in theology, a task 
which explicitly deals with conflicts of interpretation and/or evaluation. See LONERGAN, MIT, 
Chapter Ten. 
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basis or unfair bias of one's position ; to confront the possibility that one needs to be 
"converted". 
I do not hope with these few comments to develop a new foundation for studies 
in moral development or human science in general. I merely wish to point out that, as 
there are hermeneutical problems in philosophy and theology, so we must also 
recognize interpretive issues in the human sciences in general and in the study of 
moral development in particular. I believe that Kohlberg, in a circuitous fashion, is 
making a stab at this in his article, "From IS to OUGHT". Unfortunately, he 
vacillates between establishing his model empirically on the one hand, and philo-
sophically on the other. His attempt to ground his method on the principle of justice 
fails in my estimation. A recognition of the concrete contextuality of every moral 
judgment, of the normative intentionality of questions for judgment and decision, of 
the distinction yet relation between judgments of what is and judgments of what 
ought to be, and, finally, of the possibility of genuine dialectical conflicts, would 
provide a first step toward a method which could deal with fact/value issues in the 
study of moral development and in other human science endeavors. 
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